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ABSTRACT  
 
The Flash Crash of May 6, 2010 was one of the biggest flash crashes ever to be 
recorded in the history of the US stock markets. The Dow Jones Industrial Average sank 
down to 998.5 its highest intraday fall. Other indexes also met with the same fate 
resulting in a very low overall market sentiment.  The impact of Flash crash created 
havoc in the market and new developments have come up in 2015 which points to 
manipulation. This clearly shows stronger need for regulatory intervention to curb such 
events from happening again. 
 
The thesis investigates abnormal market returns over a period of one year starting from 
three months before the crash. The paper constructs an event time line to clearly 
indicate how stocks reacted before, during and after the Flash Crash. The paper 
examines abnormal returns from twenty one stocks of the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average. The results indicate that the stock return on the day of the crash is negative 
while the returns on subsequent trading days are low due to negative market sentiment 
towards the event. However the effect of the negative return is restricted only for one or 
two days after the crash.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Stock market crashes have been persistent since a long time. It has been taking place 
since the time of the great depression in 1929. Flash crashes differentiate themselves 
from the normal crashes because they crash without a valid reason and immediately 
recover in a span of few seconds. Flash crashes are always more critical than the normal 
crash and the consequence even worse. Flash crashes have a huge impact on the overall 
market structure. It affects not only the small common investor but also high volume 
traders like the institutional traders and foreign institutional investors. Technology has 
been rapidly increasing. Most of the trades taking place are driven by algorithms. 
Computer driven algorithms are capable of taking decisions faster than humans.  
 
In this generation of algorithm trading where technology is improving the efficiency it 
also gives a lot of scope for errors. In recent times the algorithms have got so 
complicated and due to various glitches in the system or the trading software it could 
lead to flash crash. Regulators keep blaming algorithm trading for the flash crashes. But 
it is not necessary that flash crashes are only caused by algorithms. It could even be 
possible to cause a flash crash due to an error caused by the trader while punching 
orders. The May 06 2010 event of the flash crash caused havoc in the US markets. Dow 
Jones industrial average was down by 1000 points. Investors lost substantial amount of 
money and it greatly affected investor sentiment. The concern over the regulatory 
authority unable to curb such event does affect the investors greatly. It could also drive 
investors out of the market greatly affecting liquidity. The prime responsibility of the 
regulators is to protect the interest of the investors. But with events like flash crash 
occurring raises a lot of questions on whether regulators need to contribute more during 
events like flash crash.  
 
The analysis of the SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) provided great insight into the 
events of the flash crash. The report noted that some stocks were traded as high as 
$100,000 while some as low as a penny. This shows how severely the trades were 
affected due to the crash. The report had suggested various possible factors that 
contributed to the flash crash. Some of the factors included loss of liquidity, execution 
of a large sell order in the E-mini and cross market arbitrage. But in 2015 the event of 
the flash crash took a very different turn as new developments started to come up on the 
cause of the flash crash. CFTC has accused a London based trader Navinder Singh 
Sarao and his company Nav Sarao Futures Limited PLC for using automated system to 
10 
 
manipulate the market on the day of the flash crash. The techniques used consisted of 
Spoofing and using Layering algorithm (CFTC v. Sarao, 2015) to create a false sense of 
direction that was favorable to him.  Currently investigation are in progress against 
Navinder Singh Sarao and his company for their involvement in the flash crash. But this 
development has provided a new direction on the cause of the flash crash and it could 
provide opportunities for future research to find the cause of the crash by factoring in 
manipulation.  
 
Immediately after the flash crash the need for stringent policies to curb such practices 
has taken utmost priority. However Angstadt (2011) has suggested in her paper not all 
regulation has been implemented. Similarly she also has mentioned that SEC/CFTreport 
(report 2010) does mention various recommendations but no specific timeline was given 
for its implementation. However certain key policies have come into immediate effect. 
The SEC/CFTC (report 2010) suggest that immediately after the crash it has 
implemented individual stock circuit breakers. Similarly new regulations have also been 
implemented in respect to broken trades. Such regulations contribute immensely in 
boosting investor confidence and can lead to a long term growth in the financial 
markets.  
 
Various research papers have focused on the events of the flash crash. Most of the 
papers do agree that liquidity crisis holds prime responsibility for the crash which was 
again indirectly caused by certain contributing factors. Easley, Prado and O’Hara (2011) 
have suggested using a metric called as “VPIN” developed by them that could even 
have the possibility of avoiding the flash crash.  Intermarket Sweep Orders (ISO) and 
their contribution surrounding the flash crash was also been a matter of debate in 
McInish, Upson and Wood (2014) and Golub, Keane and Poon (2012) paper. The effect 
of flash crash on shareholders wealth was studied by Boulton, Braga-Alves and 
Kulchania (2014). But the research done by them did not include the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average nor the volatility index “VIX”. This paper takes forward their work 
and creates an extension to their existing literature by including an added time frame 
and focusing the impact on two major US indices S&P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial 
Average and also taking into consideration the role of the volatility index. This could 
help in better understanding and could provide more conclusive evidence in respect of 
the flash crash. 
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1.1 Purpose of the study 
 
The main focus of the research will be on the events that took place on May 6, 2010 
when the Dow Jones Industrial Average lost almost close to 1000 points. It was the 
second largest intraday fall in the history of Dow Jones Industrial Average. This event 
drew wide criticism among market participants. It raised serious question whether stock 
exchanges are fully equipped to handle such kind situation and what kind of risk 
management tools are the exchanges adopting to curb any further flash crash events. 
Researchers have published various articles based on this event and have tried to focus 
more on developing metrics that could indicate the probability of flash crash occurring 
before the actual event taking place. 
 
The thesis will also try to concentrate on various aspects one being the negative effect 
that is observed in subsequent trading days after the flash crash has occurred. It is very 
common to see that markets open lower on the next trading day and there is a decline 
also in volumes in subsequent trading days. It is important to test whether such a 
negative effect is due to negative sentiments caused by the flash crash or just selling 
pressure due to profit bookings on higher levels. The common reasoning behind it is due 
to negative investor sentiment. It is very common to see that after such events investors 
are more cautious in their approach and often exit positions or book profit till the 
markets are stabilized and the volatility reduced. Investor sentiments form a very 
important aspect of the financial markets. Events such as the flash crash could drive 
away investors from the market that could result in loss of liquidity. Hence the 
following hypothesis will be tested: 
 
H0: The flash crash does not have negative effect on subsequent trading days. 
H1: The flash crash does have a negative effect on subsequent trading days. 
 
The research paper from Boulton, Braga-Alves and Manoj Kulchania (2014) have found 
negative returns after the flash crash. Taking into account similar premise the above 
mentioned hypothesis could be justified to ascertain and provide further evidence on the 
negative impact of the flash crash on subsequent trading days.  The focus of the analysis 
will be mainly be on the negative effect on subsequent trading days while other aspects 
will contribute to broadening the theory in regard to the flash crash.  
 
The next aspect will be the impact of High Frequency Trading (HFT)/ Algorithmic 
trading on flash crashes. The use of modern technology has helped improve the speed of 
12 
 
trading up to microsecond giving HFT an edge over other market participants. Complex 
trading strategies are executed in seconds using such software. But the practical use of 
such software is still highly debatable. Whether such algorithms are actually helping 
traders to make surplus profit is still in question. But there is still a lot of debate on 
whether such algorithms are the cause of flash crash. The joint report published by 
CFTC and SEC (report 2010) on the events that took place on 6 May 2010 do clearly 
state that an automated execution algorithm (Sell Algorithm) was one of the main 
reasons for the flash crash. Similarly recent developments have also pointed to London 
based trader who might be involved in the flash crash using automated trading system to 
manipulate the market. 
  
Circuit breaking mechanism also forms a core part of the financial markets. The 
volatility in the markets leads to more panic among investors which indirectly causes 
high selling situations. Circuit breaking mechanism halts the market for a stipulated 
period of time giving enough time to take account of the situation and come up with 
better quality decisions. Circuit breakers should have played a crucial role in curbing the 
flash crash but it did not happen. It is important to understand the nature and dynamics 
of the working of the circuit breakers to get a clear picture of the reason of its 
ineffectiveness. Similarly proper regulation should be drawn in respect to its working 
and investors should also be given better information so they could judge the risk in 
advance if there is a huge swing in the market. 
 
The final aspect that needs concentration is more towards regulation. The increase in 
flash crashes indicates that risk management systems were not in place. It is the sole 
responsibility of the regulator to make sure that such events do not occur. HFT/ 
Algorithmic trading are often blamed by regulators to be the reason of flash crash. The 
regulators need to take a different perspective on the way these automated trading takes 
place. Transition often takes place from old technology to new technology, similar 
transition is taking place in most developed markets where most traders are switching 
from manual trading to high complex algorithms. Regulators in such situations cannot 
impose heavy restrictions on market participants but at the same time it should not give 
market participants excess freedom to trade on heavy quantities without testing the 
technology in use. New information has cropped up in 2015 regarding the flash crash as 
CFTC has alleged Navinder Singh Sarao a London based trader and his company Nav 
Sarao Futures Limited PLC for their alleged role in the manipulation and causing the 
flash crash. If the allegations turn out to be true then it could possibly open up loopholes 
in the system that need to be addressed immediately.  Regulators need to take stringent 
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actions and try to close all possible loopholes in the system so that such events do not 
occur in the future. 
 
 
1.2 Intended contribution 
 
Flash crash has been in quite a debate ever since the crash of Dow Jones Industrial 
Average on May 06, 2010.  Most of the research papers until now have focused on 
regulatory intervention, fragmentation and role of algorithm trading but there has not 
been substantial research on abnormal returns on a longer time frame. The research 
paper runs parallel to the research done by Boulton, Braga-Alves and Kulchania (2014) 
but also adds to their contribution by conducting analysis on a longer time frame and 
adding the volatility index “VIX” to study role of VIX before, during and after the flash 
crash. Longer time frames could help to focus on the aftermath of the event and see how 
investor sentiment changes at a later stage. Similarly VIX could help study the volatility 
and it would be interesting to take a count on the number of days volatility could remain 
high after the event. 
 
The limitations of the thesis could be the in-depth review of the flash crash. Since the 
flash crash is a rare occurrence it makes it extremely difficult and be sure that the 
analysis could be validated. Since no crash has taken place before on this scale it is hard 
to create a comparison with other such events. Other limitations of the thesis include the 
impact of the flash crash on the financial markets across the world. Various researchers 
have documented the integration of the financial markets across the globe. US boasts of 
having one of the strongest financial markets in the world. Hence it would be interesting 
to see the impact of the flash crash on other market indices. 
 
 
1.3 Structure of the thesis 
 
The thesis has been structured broadly across six different chapters. Chapter one focuses 
on the introduction aspect of the thesis and includes the purpose of the research, 
hypothesis and the contribution towards the study. Chapter two focuses on the relevant 
literature review. Chapter three concentrates on the theory related to the flash crash and 
includes various key aspects such as causes of the flash crash, regulatory requirements 
and algorithm trading. Chapter four includes data description and methodology and the 
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fifth chapter focuses on the important findings of the research. The last chapter 
concludes the thesis and summaries all the important points of the research. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
There are various studies conducted on this research topic. Most of the topics associate 
flash crashes with high frequency trading. The topics discussed are very closely related 
to the flash crash that took place on the 6th May 2010 when the Dow Jones Industrial 
Average crashed to around 1000 points. It was the highest intraday crash on the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average Index.  
 
Boulton, Braga-Alves and Kulchania (2014) focus their research on the events of May 
6, 2010 by studying the possibility of earning abnormal profits from the crash. They 
take into account 29 different stocks for their study that had been cancelled by the 
exchange due to broken trades as the execution price was beyond the limit of 60 %. The 
data analyzed was tested for returns, market quality, impact on spreads and the effect on 
options segment.  To determine the returns during the event of the flash crash they 
studied abnormal returns over a period of 255 trading days and results give a clear 
indication that there negative abnormal returns of -0.80% on the day of the crash while 
the CAR is -1.77% for the window period of [0,+1].  The reasoning provided by them is 
pointed towards stub quotes that got executed at irrational prices.  
 
To analyze the market quality they concentrated their attention on the spreads. The 
results showed poor market quality which was indicated by the differences in spreads 
and high transaction costs. The paper also provides evidence of increase in turnover and 
volumes. Due to debt crisis in Europe occurring during the same time they found it 
difficult to judge the reason of the actual flash crash as there could have been the 
possibility of crisis impacting the market quality. The results from the options market 
have suggested that on the day of the flash crash the options market did record high 
volatility. The paper gives a comparison between the implied volatility on the day of the 
crash and the day previous to that and found an increase of 0.102 on the event day. 
Vega and Gamma also had changed substantially. The final conclusion clearly indicate 
that market quality was degraded, investors lost significant value and it created negative 
impact on investor sentiment. Impact was also noted with the sensitivity of options to 
the underlying assets. 
 
The link between Flash Crash and the market structure was studied by Madhavan 
(2012). The main emphasis of the paper is on market fragmentation that could have an 
impact on price movement. He defines two metrics for fragmentation one being 
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volumes and the other based on quotes that could also be potentially used for calculation 
of trading competition. The analyses on testing the fragmentation was done using time-
series on intraday data. The results indicate that fragmentation is on an all-time high 
while the results yielded on comparison with the flash crash was also found to be high 
in comparison to level during previous years.  
 
Comparison was done on exchange traded products and non-exchange traded products 
to check on the intensity of the impact on both these products due to the flash crash. The 
results indicated the ETPs were more affected in terms of price while volumes reported 
were consistently higher. The mean for ISO frequency for ETPs on the day of the flash 
crash was much higher as compared to the month before and is also statistically 
significant. Stock options were also tested in the analysis with high differences found on 
the day of the crash to the month before however the results were not significant. In 
respect of fragmentation evidence suggests that fragmentation increases with increase in 
market capitalization. No such evidence is found with quote fragmentation in relation to 
market capitalization however ISO have a positive relation with quote fragmentation. 
He also provided evidence to suggest that there is a differentiation between volume 
fragmentation and quote fragmentation. The final conclusion provided by the paper 
suggest that market fragmentation plays an important role in defining the spread of the 
Flash Crash. He also suggests that new policies incorporated by the regulator should 
also focus on issuing the problems of market fragmentation. 
 
Brewer, Civtanic and Plott (2013) used a very different approach in understanding the 
impact of regulatory intervention on a flash crash. They recreated the Flash Crash by 
considering a stimulated approach and tested various theories on it. Various regulation 
were brought to counter the flash crash and the paper concentrates on how effective 
these measures could prove in the event of a flash crash.  The stimulated approach was 
directed to study the order flow rather than the psychology behind investor’s decisions. 
The stimulation created was then used to determine the impact of order flow on 
liquidity.  The paper describes three solutions to reduce the impact of flash crash and 
restore market stability. The results from stimulation indicate that when minimum 
resting time is provided it helps in stabilizing the market by building up liquidity. The 
analysis for circuit breaking mechanism focused on five different types of circuit 
breakers. However the call auction mechanism provides better results with swift 
recovery of the market. The findings from the paper suggested that frequent traders 
could support liquidity during the time of flash crash. The requirement for resting time 
may not be very helpful to reduce the impact of flash crash. However call auction could 
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be helpful if there is an expectation of disruption due to fall in prices. The final 
conclusion given was that there is no need for intervention as markets do tend to return 
to normal levels without much interference. 
 
On the day of the flash crash trades got executed at erroneous prices. McInish, Upson 
and Wood (2014) have claimed in their paper that ISO were responsible for sell 
volumes of more than 65% for stocks with high price declines and similar reasoning 
was applied for buy volumes too. The trades were closely examined on various 
parameters to find evidence of the role that ISO played during the flash crash.  The 
impact of ISO is done using an event study methodology by using VPIN as a measure to 
calculate the toxicity in the order flow. The paper also concentrates on the influence on 
the decisions making of investors to use ISO. They describe that ISO have various 
advantages one being the faster execution speeds by using multiple order. The result 
suggest the usage of ISO substantially increased on the day of the flash crash. VPIN 
also indicated a significant rise on days towards the flash crash and continued even after 
the crash. The paper also suggest that on May 6 2010 market conditions had created a 
suitable environment for traders to opt for ISO. The final conclusion of the paper 
suggest there is an impact of ISO on flash crash and it also played a role in increasing 
the volatility.   
 
One of the most significant findings on the flash crash event was contributed by Easley, 
Prado and O’Hara (2011). They explain the relevance of order flow toxicity during a 
flash crash. Easley, Prado and O’Hara (2012) define order flow toxicity as, “Order flow 
is regarded as toxic when it adversely selects market makers, who may be unaware that 
they are providing liquidity at a loss”.  They have also developed a method to measure 
the order flow toxicity called VPIN. Their analysis reveals that there was shortage of 
liquidity much before the crash and order flow was rapidly turning toxic for the market 
makers. Order flow toxicity forces the market makers to exit the market causing 
illiquidity. The volumes were notably high on that particular day but the market was 
relatively illiquid. As mentioned in their paper that SEC/CFTC (report 2010) did stress 
in their report that high trading volume does not indicate liquidity.  
 
The two main observations that were found by the researchers were that VPIN for E-
mini S&P future was unusually high close to one week before the crash and that VPIN 
had reached its highest level at 2.30pm, two minutes before the actual flash crash. The 
SEC/CFTC (report 2010) did mention in their report that HFT originally boosted 
liquidity to the market but around 2.41-2.44pm they offloaded around 2,000 mini 
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contracts. In their study VPIN was also compared to VIX. Both of these indicators are 
used to measure volatility and should have had the same outcome but it was not the case 
on 6 may, 2010. While VPIN had a steady increase and reached an all-time high two 
minutes before the crash, VIX did not have a significant rise till the market had crashed 
to very low levels.  
 
The main idea of their research was to give a twofold interpretation and potential uses 
of VPIN. The first interpretation suggested that it could be used to measure flow 
toxicity at normal levels while at abnormal level it could indicate the market makers 
would suck out the liquidity from the market by exiting position which could lead to 
crashes.  The second interpretation was that VPIN could be used to monitor crashes 
which arise out of liquidity though quite rare it does occur. The authors recommended 
that VPIN should be traded as a contract just like the volatility index. This would enable 
brokers to use VPIN as a benchmark index; regulators could use the volatility to halt 
trading to avoid the events like May 6th 2010 from reoccurring and it could also be used 
for volatility arbitrage. 
 
The paper by Easley, Prado and O’Hara (2011) was contradicted by another paper 
written by Anderson and Bondarenko (2014). They conduct an in-depth analysis of two 
metrics TR-VPIN and BR-VIPIN and note their impact on the flash crash. The data 
used by them is the same as the one used by Easley, Prado and O’Hara (2011) to 
maintain uniformity.  The most important finding in their paper is the results from 
analysis of TR-VPIN that indicate an historical high after the flash crash which provides 
evidence that it is not a good indicator for the predication of flash crash.  The 
association between trading intensity and OI was also discussed in the paper. Trading 
intensity has an impact on OI and since VPIN is derived from OI their findings suggest 
positive correlation with OI and VPIN.  The test done to study the effectiveness of TR-
VPIN in predicting flash crash didn’t have any exceptional results that could provide 
any indication or signs of a crash before the actual crash. Similar results were obtained 
with BV-VPIN. The main reasoning that they came up with was VPIN cannot predict 
future volatility; VIX index is far more accurate to VPIN for shorter time frames, VPIN 
construction is linked to the trading intensity of the underlying asset and its predictive 
power is considered on the basis of trading variation. 
 
There was another paper written by Easley, Prado and O’Hara (2014) to counter the 
paper written by Anderson and Bondarenko. They tried to explain why the analysis 
from Anderson and Bondarenko is incorrect and how VPIN is to be interpreted.  VPIN 
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was interpreted quite differently in Anderson and Bondarenko paper because they used 
a different approach to classify trades in order to get realized volatility measure into 
VPIN. They mainly associated volatility with VPIN. While the paper written by Easley, 
Prado and O’Hara measures VPIN using a different direction that relies more on order 
imbalance. They give more emphasis on toxicity rather than on volatility.  
 
The final paper written by Anderson and Bondarenko (2014) finally tries to put an end 
to the debate between both sides. They suggest that VPIN was not using usual volatility 
indicators for prediction but they found that volume and volatility information was 
important to predict the influence on VPIN. If volume and volatility were controlled 
then VPIN shows no predictive powers and the tests turn insignificant. They still could 
not confirm whether VPIN reached a historical high before the crash, whether VPIN 
plays an instrumental role in forecasting shot term volatility or whether bulk volume is 
more suitable then tick rule for transaction data. They hope to provide answers in future 
papers. 
 
Lee, Cheng and Koh (2011) focus their research on the role of positions limits on the 
flash crash. They used a stimulation approach to recreate the flash crash under various 
scenarios and tested the impact of positions limits. They couldn’t find any direction with 
the theory of high frequency trading in the role of the flash crash but feel the major 
contribution is pointed towards various trading strategies. They have also suggested in 
their paper that the safety net implied by the exchanges like trading halts could have 
worsened the situation. They also were not convinced with the effectiveness of 
Liquidity Replenishment Points and also considered the cancellation of trades by the 
exchange as an unfair practice for market participants as they may not find any 
incentives in providing liquidity for such future events. The stimulation approach that 
they recreate was used to test position limits, change in auctions system and using price 
limits at various levels. The speculation suggested trading venues and dependence in 
various assets as the biggest contribution for flash so the modeling of the simulation 
was done considering these two parameters.  They also find that price limitation prove 
to be more reliable method for market stabilization in comparison to position limits. 
They concluded their paper with various recommendation that could help in market 
stabilization.  
 
There was a high inclination towards the role of HFT on the impact of flash crash. 
Kirilenko, Kyle, Samadi and Tuzun (2015) concentrated their research on the impact of 
HFT. Their main focus is on the electronic market. They begin their research by 
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classifying participants on various parameters and then qualify them as intraday 
intermediaries if they meet the criteria set. Further classification is done and then they 
are separated into HFT and market makers and also made a note that the price plays a 
major role based on which market participants decide the volumes to trade and alter 
their position accordingly. Various other kind of traders are clubbed in a separate 
category. The analysis of the volume indicate HFT and market makers had a drop in 
volume on the day of the crash in comparison to three days prior to the crash. They 
study the price changes on the day of the flash crash and three days prior to it and study 
the change in volumes in HFT and market makers. The volumes traded during the four 
days were consistently very low in comparison to the massive sell order projected in the 
SEC/CFTC report (report, 2010)    
 
The key findings for HFT suggests that HFT is statistically significant and the 
relationship remains static even during the flash crash however there was a change in 
relationship for the market makers. Their analysis over the three day suggest that when 
HFT start buying the prices enter into an upward movement and remain there for 20 
seconds after execution. The study distinguishes HFT on the basis of how aggressively 
they trade. They find prices tend to move in the upward direction for about 20 % if HFT 
trade aggressively in comparison to 2% on passive trades.  Consideration was also given 
to see the trading pattern of HFT after the bid value decreases and offer value increases. 
The results show HFT follow a very different pattern as compared to market makers. 
The final conclusion put forward indicate HFT participant did not overstress and stuck 
to a consistent approach unlike market makers on the day of the flash crash.  
 
The reasons on what caused the flash crash was studied by Aldrich, Grundfest and 
Laughlin (2016). In their analysis they have undertaken a thorough examination of the 
order book to focus on the causes behind various events that contributed to the flash 
crash. Their research also questions the reasoning behind the allegation put forth by the 
government of United States of America in respect to a trader called Navinder Sarao’s 
who’s was held accountable for the flash crash due to his illegal trading activities. They 
try to counter this theory put forward and agree with the evidence from the SEC/CFTC 
report (report, 2010) as they are more in line with their findings. Their approach 
recreates the flash crash using a stimulation and they find that the set of events that 
occurred as per the SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) could actually lead to a flash crash 
like event. The analysis is divided into four different segments first being the analysis of 
the order book, second the impact liquidity crisis on the order book was checked to 
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verify the case of Sarao, third stimulations was done to know the origins of the flash 
crash, fourth they test an anomaly in regard to the flash crash.  
 
To get a better understanding of the messaging scenario on the day of the flash crash 
they compared the messaging frequency with the date on August 9, 2011. The day when 
the messaging frequency was recorded the highest at the CME. They found various 
similarities between both the days which included the time period, volume, messaging 
rates measured in megabyte per second. The analysis from messaging provides leads to 
how arbitrageurs who generally are on an advantage when the market turns one sided 
were unable to find such opportunities during the flash crash.  The results from the 
imbalances provides evidence that suggest Sarao’s trading activity might not have a 
huge impact to the contribution of the flash crash. A significant trading pattern created 
by the algorithms used by Sarao’s might have been misinterpreted for the cause of the 
actual flash crash. Simulation approach was used to study the origination of the flash 
crash. The analysis was in line with the SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) which had 
given indication of hot potato effect. During the research they also find an anomaly that 
could suggest another reasoning for the flash crash but they didn’t possesses any 
substantial evidence to prove such a fact and have kept it for future research. They try to 
also suggest the fact that for non-repetition of a flash crash it would be beneficial that 
new law come into effect taking into consideration of the SEC/CFTC report (report 
2010) as their finding are very similar to the report.  
 
The impact of the how past returns could affect the value of stock during the flash crash 
is studied by Yu (2011). He suggests that contrarian investors have a very important 
role for such kind of effect. The key aspect of the paper is to get a clear view of the 
intensity in the drop of prices of some stocks over the other during the flash crash. The 
analysis for the relation between past stock return and the size of the crash reveals a 
positive relation which suggest that stock that tend to have better past return have a high 
intensity for crashing during a flash crash. The reasoning provided by them is pointed to 
stocks with low liquidity generally halt trading during flash crash. The research also 
focus on the relative value trading and studies various strategies deployed by these kind 
of traders and find a negative correlation between past return and the size of the crash. 
Their findings also suggest contrarian traders could play a role in the reduction of 
liquidity shock.  
 
Menkveld and Yueshen (2015) take a different perspective in comparison to all other 
previous literature. The common notion suggested by most literature was that the seller 
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was made to pay as he demanded additional liquidity but their paper suggested that the 
seller was made to pay a premium for demanding additional liquidity. Their findings 
include that the crash did not occur due to the consequences of price pressure. The 
analysis also gives a broader picture of cross market arbitrage that had halted and due to 
this most investor were restricted to trade in a single exchange and this in turn lead to 
liquidity crisis. This analysis is also connected to the algorithm used by the large seller 
and the result from the analysis are in line with SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) which 
stated the algorithm was targeting a 9% volume for executions. Their analysis reveal 
that the broken arbitrage could have brought about a change in market dynamics as the 
large seller continued to sell in the market without consideration to change in market 
conditions. Their final conclusion suggest that the cost for demanding liquidity could 
prove to be extremely expensive if there is occurrence of broken arbitrage. This news 
could be very disturbing and cause huge impact to the institutional investors as they 
tend to depend on cross-market arbitrage. 
 
The smaller version of flash crash can be termed as mini flash crash as it has been the 
prime focus for Golub,Keane and Poon research paper. The time frame considered for 
the study is limited to only four months but months picked for the study is seen to be the 
most volatile for the time period from 2006-2011. They categorize the mini flash crash 
into two categories ISO initiated and auto-routing-initiated on the basis of origination. 
Their findings suggest a higher proportion of crashes occurring due to ISO than auto-
routing. There were also a set of criteria that was supposed to be met to qualify for each 
of the categories. The research also focused on the participants responsible to have 
caused the crash and indicated a higher possibility of HFT players for the ISO trades. 
The findings suggest that the spread difference increased widely immediately after the 
crash. The intensity of the crash is also at an alarming rate of below 1.5 seconds and the 
effect stays for a minute. They also concentrate their analysis of locked and crossed 
market which is banned as per the regulation of NMS. They find a major percentage of 
locked and crossed NBBO quotes to occur after the crash within a time frame of 1 
minute while a lower percentage to occur before the crash. The analysis of the quoted 
volumes suggest that there is an overall reduction in volumes after the crash. Liquidity 
was a concern during the flash crash and the paper focuses on the concept of fleeting 
liquidity which is created artificially to provide false sense of liquidity to provide 
direction to the market. They set predefined criteria that had to be met to prove fleeting 
liquidity present in a mini flash crash. The results did prove that fleeting liquidity was 
present.  
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The main conclusions derived from the research did suggest that the regulation did help 
in integrating markets but since the rise of algorithm driven trading this arrangement 
have led to various complications in the market. The core problem suggested was due to 
various exchanges present in the US market leading to a diversification of liquidity 
across exchanges and reducing the liquidity in each market which could also give an 
unfair advantage to the algorithm traders. Their paper also gives suggestion to investors 
to focus on the impact that their orders could have before placing their orders. They 
hold ISO responsible for the flash crash and have mentioned that traders using ISOs 
have full knowledge of the situation as the use of ISO is subject to use of limit order 
similarly they also have knowledge of the liquidity present in the market. So the 
manipulation could be done in purpose rather than it being done unknowingly. 
Regulatory action was also called for just as many other research papers focused on it 
and the stringent measures needed to be taken on those involved with the crash.  
 
Angstadt (2011) has focused on the various changes brought in by the regularity 
authority and the future impact of the initiatives taken by SEC. Her take on the 
SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) suggest that the report only focus on the event of the 
flash crash but did not concentrate or give a timeline when the regulations 
recommended will come into effect. She does mention that the regulatory authority have 
given priority to some of the recommendations and new policies have come into 
immediate effect such as introducing circuit breakers for single stocks, removal of stub 
quotes, new regulations in terms broken trades. The paper also focus on the obligation 
of HFT as they tend to be liquidity providers. The finding of SEC/CFTC (report 2010) 
clearly had stated that liquidity had fallen short in the market. Similarly correlations 
were being drawn between the drop in liquidity and high frequency trading. The theory 
provided in the paper also suggested of the drop in numbers of market makers due to 
electronic systems coming into place making executions very swift. New regulation 
made also did not provide any emphasis on the role of market makers nor was there a 
need for registration of market makers. This created a loophole giving advantage to 
HFT to play the role of market maker without having to register.  
 
The paper has provided analysis on the change in role of liquidity providers in terms of 
their obligation and their advantages. Previously exchanges did provide the incentives 
and made the market makers to take up some obligations in regards to providing 
liquidity. Soon the obligations were curtailed and freedom was provided to markets 
makers as regulations did not provide clear understanding of their responsibilities. Her 
paper has provided indication that obligations must be set for the liquidity providers by 
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the concerned authorities and in return they should also provide some incentives for 
providing liquidity. Emphasis was also laid on the co-location and data feed. Computer 
servers located close to the exchanges trading system result in getting undue advantage 
as it provides immediate quotes and an advantage to traders having such an 
arrangement. Another area of focus was data feed since additional data feed was 
provided by some data providers which had more information than the national 
consolidated data feed she suggested for further research on its acceptance. The research 
study also focuses on the order cancellation as they could be considered as a form of 
manipulation and had some role in the crash. 
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3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
 
 
This chapter will focus on the theoretical aspect of the study.  Since algorithm 
trading/High frequency trading is very closely associated to flash crash the relevant 
theory is added to this chapter.  Flash crashes are events that are quite rare in real time 
scenario so it is very important to review the history and past trends of flash crashes. 
Trading errors, circuit breaking mechanism and scope for better regulation will also be 
covered in this chapter. 
 
3.1  History and Past Trends 
 
Stock markets are bound to be very volatile. Index’s rise and fall, investors gain and 
lose but the estimation of volatility put forth by the investor always has a certain limit to 
it. But when those limits are crossed investors wealth is eroded to a great extent and it is 
often referred as stock market crash.  Stock market crashes have been occurring right 
from 1819 to the present 2007-2009 United States Bear Market.  Stock market crashes 
are quite persistent but they do take place for a definite reason.  These reasons could 
vary from financial crisis, recession to various kinds of scams in the market.  Stock 
market crashes occur generally due to state of panic.  
 
Flash crashes are quite different from normal crash. It takes place in a matter of seconds 
while a normal crash does takes place over a longer period of time. Flash crash does not 
have a valid reason for a crash it generally takes place due to errors while trading.  If 
you take a look at the history of flash crashes we don’t have to turn far back in terms of 
time duration because most of the flash crashes are all recent phenomena.  They have 
started to take place recently because investors are adopting more complex strategies 
and algorithms to execute trade. Flash crashes are not only restricted to US but it has 
also occurred in other countries such as Singapore, China and India which provides 
clear indication of two main reasons one that investors are rapidly migrating from 
traditional trading platform to more advanced algorithm trading/ HFT software’s and 
second that individual traders are dealing with bulk quantities indicating increase in 
turnover of volume. The most significant flash crash that ever took place occurred in the 
United States of America on 6th May 2010 when the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
crashed by almost 1000 points. The SEC/CFTC (report 2010) was published on 
September 30, 2010 give deep insights as to what led to such drastic turn of events.  
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3.2  Factors Causing the Flash Crash 
 
A flash crash which generally tend to have a quick fall and recovery can be associated 
with various reasons. On May 6, 2010 the Dow Jones Industrial Average had one of its 
highest intraday losses due to the Flash Crash.  The SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) 
suggested various reason for the Flash Crash. There is a need to have an in-depth 
analysis of the reasons behind the Flash Crash to avoid any future occurrences of similar 
events. Various regulatory changes have been implemented and come into effect 
immediately after researching on various factors that caused the crash. The SEC/CFTC 
report (report 2010) have presented a chronological order of the happening of the event 
much prior to the actual event taking into account all factors including the concerns 
arising from European Debt Crisis.  
 
3.2.1 Liquidity Crisis 
 
The Flash Crash was a result of extreme selling by market participants but not enough 
buyers to absorb the trades leading to a fall in liquidity and causing prices to crash to 
extreme low levels. Liquidity Crisis is mentioned as the core reason in the SEC/CFTC 
report (report 2010) and its evident with any type of crash including the financial crisis 
that if the market lacks liquidity to support the selling pressure it will result in huge fall 
in prices. The crash cannot be restricted to one particular instrument and it is evident to 
find the effect in several other tradable assets as most markets are linked with one and 
other. Similarly derivatives are instruments that have a direct replication to the base 
underlying asset. So a fall in the underlying asset will also result in the fall in the future 
& options market.   
 
The SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) finds that both E-mini and SPY lacked liquidity 
resulting a fall in prices. Both the funds are correlated with each other as they replicate 
the S&P 500. The analysis reveal that E-mini and SPY reached its lowest point not at 
the same time this was due to a sudden fall in liquidity in E-mini much before than 
SPY. There was also a halt on the E-mini which helped for it prices to recover but no 
such halt took place on the SPY. The role of cross-market arbitrage was also discussed 
as they enabled to close the gaps between E-mini and SPY until the fall in liquidity 
observed in E-mini.  After E-mini individual stocks also faced the liquidity crisis. The 
event lead to different actions taken by various market participants. Large market 
traders who used superior trading system had in build design to halt trading if prices 
crossed certain predefined limits. This gave them time to reassess their situation and 
27 
 
change their strategy taking into consideration various factors. Immediately after 
reconsideration various market participant came up with alternate strategies while some 
considered exiting from the overall market.  Following the event the prices did recover 
within the span of few minutes but due to low market sentiment the price continued to 
be negative.  
 
3.2.2 Large Sell Order 
 
The Flash Crash event that occurred on May 6, 2010 was contributed by a various 
events. The trading day that started with uncertainties from the European Debt was 
relatively stable as the day progressed. The actual fall in price as reported by 
SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) occurred due to an institutional investor who initiated a 
bulk sell order using a sell algorithm through an automated trading system.  The 
execution mechanism was set to give consideration only to volume resulting the whole 
order to get executed in 20 minutes. Initially some market participants absorbed the sell 
order but soon they started reversing their positions resulting to a Flash Crash.   
  
3.2.3 Cross Market Arbitrageurs 
 
Arbitrageurs are traders who simultaneously trade in different markets to profit from the 
price inefficiency. The SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) have viewed cross-market 
arbitrageurs as one of the main reason for the transmission of the liquidity crisis to 
individual stocks and across various markets. In the absence of the cross-market 
arbitrageurs there could have been a possibility of isolating the Flash Crash only to E-
mini contracts. Cross-Market arbitrageurs can build various strategies to suit their 
trading strategy. The role played by cross-market arbitrageur in transmission of the 
liquidity crisis can be ascertained by an example given in the SEC/CFTC report (report 
2010) where they have mentioned that if the cross-market arbitrageurs are trading 
simultaneously in two different market and the prices start to drop in one of the market 
than the arbitrageurs will soon start to reduce their bids and offer prices in the other 
market too.  The report also suggest that the main preferred markets for cross-market 
arbitrageurs was the E-mini as it possessed high liquidity, SPY and stocks from the S&P 
500 index. Most of the cross market arbitrageurs halted trading during the crash while 
other who were trading noticed that E-mini was responsible to get prices back to normal 
level in the SPY and for the stocks in the S&P 500.    
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3.2.4 S&P 500 
 
E-mini and SPY are a direct replication of the S&P 500 index. There arises a possibility 
that the fall in prices that was observed in the E-mini was caused due to S&P 500.  To 
verify this claim the SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) described the detailed analysis 
carried out by them. They took into consideration the order book for E-mini and SPY 
and compared it against the stocks present in the S&P 500 index. The analysis suggests 
that prices of S&P 500 remained relatively stable during the entire duration right from 
the start of the day even during the decline that began at 2.00 pm.  The rapid descend 
began in S&P 500 after 2.30 pm and again the order book remained fairly stable. The 
drastic fall in the buy-side depth began at 2.45 pm and hit a low at 2.49 pm after which 
the reversal trend began in the S&P 500. After the in-depth analysis and comparison 
between the order books in the E-mini, SPY and the S&P 500 they found that the fall in 
the buy-side liquidity initially began in the E-mini and was then followed in the SPY 
and S&P 500. The analysis also indicates that E-mini was the first to recover from the 
crisis much before than the SPY and S&P 500 giving a clear sign of that the liquidity 
crisis was initiated by E-mini.  
 
3.2.5 Intermarket Sweep Orders 
 
Various factors were considered by the SEC/CFTC report (report 2011) that possibly 
lead to the Flash Crash. The intermarket sweep orders was one of the factors not taken 
in to consideration in the detailed analysis presented in the report. The evidence of the 
impact of Intermarket Sweep Order on Flash Crash could be critical for traders to 
change the direction of execution of their limit orders if there is a reoccurrence of such 
an event in the future.   
 
McInish, Upson and Wood (2014) have analyzed the impact of Intermarket Sweep 
Order on Flash Crash while also taking into consideration the trading aggressiveness 
and liquidity supply. During the Flash Crash extreme price movements was noticed and 
in their research paper they have defined this extreme price movement and have also 
found close to 20 stocks that had extreme price movements during the Flash Crash.  
They study the Intermarket Sweep Order on the day of the Flash Crash and compare it 
with the use of it from the beginning of the month till the end. They also use VPIN 
metric to validate the toxicity in the order flow of the ISO before the Flash Crash.VPIN 
for ISO consistently stayed high before the Flash Crash and maintained its high level 
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after the crash also. The impact of ISO remained to be inconsistent on the Flash Crash 
but it resulted in high volatility. 
 
3.2.6 Trading Strategies 
 
Most of the traders use trading strategies to execute trade. Trading strategies can be 
simple or complex using various automated trading systems. While trading strategies 
are built to meet specific demands of the investors it could also lead to transmission of 
liquidity and volatility from one market to another. Lee, Cheng and Koh (2011) have 
focused on the changes that could have been possible if position limits would be 
implemented on the day of the Flash Crash. While most of the research papers find high 
frequency trading linked to the Flash Crash they find no connection between the two 
instead find trading strategies more relevant. Similarly they also point towards circuit 
breakers and consider its role crucial in accelerating the issue. They regenerate the 
events of the Flash Crash by taking a simulated approach using various techniques on a 
computer. Nine different simulations were recreated which was then tested for 3 
different alternatives namely position limits, price limits and changing the auction 
pattern to discrete time from continuous time. The conclusions drawn indicate that lack 
of liquidity in the market is caused due to one sided participation that is brought about 
by the trading players who anticipate the direction of the market. They suggest changes 
in the trading strategies in accordance with the market conditions had an impact on the 
Flash Crash rather than high frequency trading.  
 
3.2.7 Stub Quotes 
 
Stub quotes have often been associated with Flash Crash in various research literatures. 
Stub quotes are orders placed far beyond the markets current prices by market makers. 
They generally are not meant to be executed which is the reason they are kept at the 
extreme ends of the market. On the day of the Flash Crash these quotes did get executed 
and was considered as one of the factor that ignited the already worse situation.  
 
The SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) gives a brief description of the reason for the 
placement of stub quotes. The report mentions that market makers have to place 
quotation on both sides of the market in compliance with rules set by the exchange to 
ensure fair functioning of the market. Since these prices have no relevance for the 
market makers they are often kept at the extreme ends of the market ensuring non-
execution of these quotes and are done so only for the purpose of compliance. 
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Exchanges gives various options to market makers to choose the process of generating 
stub quotes either automatically or that move up and down simultaneously with respect 
to the price movements.  On May 6, 2010 the report found that more than 20,000 trades 
were broken by the regulatory authority FINRA and the stock exchange on account of 
violation in respect to regulation pertaining to erroneous trades. On the day of the crash 
the execution of the market orders were done on the basis of liquidity available in the 
market which unfortunately happened to be the stub quote as there were no other orders 
available. Stub quotes do not have a limit so they keep generating automatically and this 
lead to continuous executions of the orders. The report concluded that most of the 
orders executed through stub quotes were from the retail investors which got executed 
at stub quotes level as markets makers had stopped providing liquidity to the market 
during the time of the crash.  
 
3.2.8 Liquidity Replenishment Points 
 
Liquidity Replenishment Points is a feature common to traders of the NYSE. It typically 
acts like a circuit breakers but in a very different way.  SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) 
have considered LRP as an indirect factor that could have been possibly responsible for 
the Flash Crash.  The report suggests that LRP are typically used to reduce volatility by 
bringing about a change in trading system.  Such a halt can be beneficial in reducing the 
intensity of a crash as the trading halts for the automated segment with a short time 
frame between 1 second to up to 2 minutes. The key differentiation between a circuit 
breaker and a LPR is that the later as mentioned by the report is only to reduce the speed 
on the opposite direction of the market not to completely halt the trading. The LPR is 
revoked once prices get reverted back within LRP limits but can again be imposed again 
depending on the situation. The investors are at advantage as they can pull out of the 
market at any possible time before execution.  
 
The day of the Flash Crash LPR were being continuously triggered at an extremely high 
rate as compared to any other normal trading day. The analysis of the report was also 
based on interviews taken by various market participants. Most of the trading system of 
investors had automatic routing mechanism that could transfer orders to other 
exchanges in case if the LPR is implemented on the NYSE. The implementation of LPR 
did not cause any effect in the transition of orders to the other exchanges. But most 
traders withdrew from the market after the constant implementation of LPR as they 
considered it as a sign of distress in the market.  
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The SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) while focusing on the involvement of the LPR took 
into account the number of broken trades in the market. A high proportion of the broken 
trades did not belong to the NYSE while the one’s that did 42 stocks had 
implementation of LPR with durations for 10 or more seconds. The analysis done was 
to focus on first the executions at other exchanges in exchange of liquidity present in 
NYSE and second was to determine whether NYSE responsible in attracting more 
liquidity during LRP from other exchanges. The report provides evidence that liquidity 
on NYSE did not have a high contribution to the executions on other exchanges due to 
the fact that buy side depth for NYSE was completely depleted and no trades were 
taking place on exchanges other than NYSE. No evidence was also found in regard to 
NYSE attracting liquidity. The role on LRP in the crisis was only restricted to the 
withdrawal from the market due to the consideration of continuous implementation of 
LRP as a sign of distress but no evidence in respect to liquidity crisis was found making 
the association between the Flash Crash and LRP totally unrelated. 
 
3.2.9 Declaration of Self Help 
 
Liquidity was the considered as one of the main reasons for the Flash Crash. Hence it 
was important to study all the factors in depth that could have led to the possibility of 
creation of a liquidity crisis which could have ultimately led to the event of Flash Crash. 
The role of self-help declaration on the liquidity was also taken into consideration in the 
SEC/CFTC report (2010). Declarations of self-help is considered one of exceptions to 
the Rule 611 that focus on the issue of “trade-throughs”.  The implementation of the 
rule 611 (a) makes it necessary to have policies in place to check on the prevention of 
trade execution at any other price except the “protected quotation”. The rule 611 (b) 
deals with the exceptions to the rule that have to be followed in line with the regulation 
set. The exception was created to address the problem of any kind of malfunctioning in 
using the protected quotations. The report also suggests about the exception in ISO 
orders that when combined with the self-help can authorize the ISO order to utilize self-
help mechanism to skip protected quotation.   
 
On the day of the event as mentioned in the report, self-help was initiated on NYSE 
ARCH by two exchanges Nasdaq and Nasdaq OMX BX. Both the exchanges disclosed 
about their action on implementing the self-help through their website thus giving full 
knowledge to the market participants. But even with having knowledge about the 
implementation of self-help most investors continued trading the similar way without 
bringing any change. The role played by self-help as questioned by report could have 
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led to problem in liquidity as and when the other two exchanges started to redirect the 
orders while skipping NYSE Arca causing a fall in volumes at NYSE Arca. Analysis 
was done of the volumes in NYSE Arca before and after the implementation of Self-
help. Similarly a comparison of the executed sell orders at NYSE Arca and orders of 
Nasdaq that were bypassed was done to get a complete picture. The analysis done 
couldn’t find a direct connection that could indicate that self-help declaration was 
responsible for the liquidity crisis during the time of the crash however it did manage to 
close the price gap between NYSE ARCA and other exchanges.  
 
3.2.10 Market Data 
 
Market information is very important to investors. Every investor must receive the right 
information at the right time. The timing of the information can give an undue 
advantage to the recipient if the information is received before others. It is necessary for 
the purpose of fair practice that market data is passed to everyone at the same time. 
SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) has mentioned issues in market data that could have 
possibly contributed to the liquidity crisis on the day of the Flash Crash.  
 
The report mentions of two different data feeds that is available for the clients. One 
being the proprietary data feed that gives clients an advantage as it is delivered directly 
to clients making them receive information much faster. The other information 
transferring process gives out consolidated information to clients and it is relatively 
slower as it goes through the securities information processor who is responsible for 
preparing the market data and sending it out. The report finds that on May 6, 2010 
information was not being sent of out swiftly as it did usually and found NYSE was 
conducting upgradation work on its systems that deal with market information.  The 
delays were blamed on high volumes and some stocks faced delays of over 20 seconds. 
The delay are quite prevalent in the market but the report gave extra emphasis on the 
how the delays impacted on the day of the Flash Crash.  
 
The report suggest most of the trading systems do face delay but these delay are quite 
small mostly of less than 10 milliseconds. Many large participants and retail investors 
who tend to use proprietary data feed shouldn’t have faced any delay as compared to 
those using consolidated information. As the proprietary data and system using 
consolidated information get information from two different sources delay in one should 
not cause any issues in the other. CTS and CQS data feeds consists of system giving out 
consolidated information and delays on them did impact those using proprietary data 
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feed. The report considered the possibility of data integrity made trading system to 
freeze which led to drop in liquidity. Those using CTS and CQS system the delays 
played a crucial role in deciding whether to halt trading completely. One of the 
hypothesis analyzed was whether clients receiving information from proprietary feeds 
have an advantage on those who receive consolidated information. But this hypothesis 
was ruled out as there is virtually no possibility of such an advantage as the orders get 
executed on the quotes finally available on the exchange and the actual prices on the 
exchange differ from the prices on the consolidated data feed.  
 
They have stated one exception to this hypothesis called dark pool which gets through 
by referencing the price and it could give an advantage to the investor by transferring 
order to the dark pool and then to the exchange making it possible to grab the spread 
from the pricing difference. But the report suggests that the possibility of this happening 
is quite restricted as the order may not get through and since large percentage relies on 
proprietary data feed.  
 
3.2.11 CFTC V. Sarao 
 
The SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) covered most of the reasons that led to the crash 
but some new evidence has come up in 2015 when CFTC blamed a London based trader 
Navinder Sarao and his company Nav Sarao Futures Limited PLC for using certain set 
of algorithms to manipulate and profit from the flash crash. CFTC has ascertained that 
his actions were responsible to have caused the flash crash and criminal proceeding 
have charged against him and his company. Navinder Sarao has been able to profit $8.9 
million from such illegal transaction. (USA v. Sarao, 2015) 
 
The allegations laid down by the CFTC has mentioned that Sarao had been using certain 
automated trading system to manipulate the market and gain heavily from such 
transaction (CFTC V. Sarao, 2015). It also mentions that he has been entering large 
orders into the system with no intention of execution but only to give the market a false 
sense of direction. The manipulative practices alleged by CFTC includes spoofing by 
using layering algorithm that involves filling the sell order book with large orders on 
different price levels. When the prices moved closer towards the order the algorithms 
modified the order further away so that they would not be executed but at the same time 
made sure they appeared in the order book. Most of the orders were later cancelled. This 
algorithm would succeed in creating artificial volatility which could then be used for his 
benefit. The allegation claim that defendants have gained close to $40 million using 
34 
 
such manipulation tactics. CFTC has also suggested that certain set of traders make 
decisions based on the order book. If the order book has a large amount of sell orders 
then it gives an indication that the market prices will fall from current level. Similarly 
strategies using automated systems are also build relaying on the order book. If Sarao 
used such manipulation all such traders would be on a disadvantage.   
 
The allegations also state that Sarao was able to benefit from both sides of the market. 
The layering algorithm used by him could cause the price to drop and he would benefit 
by taking short position. Similarly as the prices drop he would stop the algorithm which 
would again lead to prices surging and he would benefit by taking long positions. As he 
traded in high volumes the profit made was enormous from such transaction. Another 
method used was spoofing by using 188/289 lots this was used mutually along with the 
layering algorithm. Similarly a 2000 lot was used to create a false sense of execution on 
the side that was favorable to the defendant by placing it on both sides and then 
immediately deleting the order. On the day of the flash crash too they have suggested 
that he has used 188/289 lot spoofing on a time frame between 11:17 am and 1:40pm. 
This led to the drop in E-mini futures which eventually contributed to the flash crash.  
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FLASH CRASH-May 06, 2010 
1 PM – Negative Market Sentiment 
Greek Debt Crisis Sharp Decline in 
Euro 
          2:30 PM – VIX 22.5 %       & DJIA 2.5%  
2:32 PM – Large Sell Order 75000 E-Mini Contracts 
Liquidity Crisis 
Figure 1:  Time Line of the day during the Flash Crash Event Day on May 06, 2010. 
Source: SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) 
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Liquidity Crisis 
Broad Index Level 
2:41 PM-2:44 PM - E-Mini 3%      & SPY 3%   
2:45:13-2:45:27 E-Mini 5 %     Intraday Low 1056 & SPY 6% 
2:45:28 PM – CME Stop Functionality Triggered – E-
Mini Paused for 5 Seconds 
2:45:33 PM – Prices Stabilized E-Mini & SPY Recover  
Figure 2: Liquidity Crisis in E-Mini and SPY during the Flash Crash on May 06, 
2010 Source: SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) 
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Liquidity Crisis 
Individual Stocks 
2:45 PM – Crisis Began to Unfold in Individual Stocks 
Halt in Automated Trading System  
Liquidity Evaporated & Trades Executed at Irrational 
Prices 
      3:00 PM – Stocks Reverted to Normal Trading Prices 
Figure 3: Liquidity Crisis in Individual Stock during the Flash Crash on May 06, 
2010 Source: SEC/CFTC report (report 2010) 
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Figure 1 provides us insights using a time line scenario on the happening of the event of 
the flash crash on May 06, 2010.  From the information provided by SEC/CFTC report 
(report 2010) indicated the market deteriorating from 1 PM onwards due to the Greek 
Debt Crisis and fall in Euro against two major currencies. The volatility index “VIX” 
had a major rise in its value to 22.5 % while the S&P 500 dropped by 2.5 %.  In such 
stressful conditions a large sell order from a mutual fund complex using a complex 
algorithm software caused a chain of events led by high frequency traders ultimately 
resulting in liquidity crisis. 
Figure 2 provides us with a time line for the liquidity crisis that occurred in the index of 
E-Mini futures as reported in the SEC/CFTC report (report 2010). The crisis began at 
2:41 pm. The crash in E-mini was contributed primarily to the sell algorithm and HFT 
players.  The impact was also felt in SPY and it was mainly contributed to the cross 
market arbitrageurs. The E-mini and SPY fell substantially during 2:45:13-2:45:27, 
during the same time the rapid decline also led to the fall in liquidity as none of the 
liquidity providers were willing to provide liquidity. The halt in the E-mini for 5 
seconds due to the Stop Logic Functionality brought some relief as prices began to 
recover 
 
Figure 3 covers the liquidity crisis for the individual stocks. According to SEC/CFTC 
report (2010) the liquidity crisis in individual stocks begins to unfold at 2:45 PM. The 
report gives a description of the aftermath of the trading halt and has mentioned that 
traders had to reconsider their situation. This reassessment done by the traders give an 
indication that it could be the reason for the liquidity crisis in individual stocks. This is 
based on the conclusion that when E-Mini was recovering buying interest had 
considerably reduced in individual stocks. This fall in liquidity led to trade executions at 
erroneous prices. At 3 PM price finally returned to their normal levels. 
 
 
3.3 Structure of Algorithm Trading 
 
Technology has developed rapidly in the recent decade. Most of the exchanges have 
already switched to computer based trading from the traditional open outcry system. 
With vast improvements in technology there has developed a growing need among 
traders to use software’s that are fast and can execute complicated strategies with ease. 
Algorithm trading has been able to provide most traders low latency in executing 
complex strategies thus giving an extra edge over traditional traders. Hendershott, Jones 
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and Menkveld (2010) has suggested in their paper that in 2009 approximately 73% of 
the trades in the US markets were done through algorithm trading.  
 
A flash crash generally occurs due to various reasons. The most common being fat 
finger trades where trades generally occur due to errors done by a trader while punching 
orders in to the system.  This kind of trade was visible during the flash crash that hit 
Indian markets in 2012.  Fat finger trades is very common in trading circles but does not 
cause huge impact on the market if the volumes traded is very low and by using better 
risk management system. The significant cause of flash crash can be pointed towards 
algorithm trading. 
 
Algorithm trading is trading by computer system with minimum interference by 
humans.  Various algorithms are programmed to execute complex strategies. These 
strategies are very difficult and time consuming if it was to be executed by a trader 
manually. It was also implemented so that it could enable avoiding of errors done by 
human while trading manually. Retail investors usually do not trade using algorithms 
and find it hard to compete with the institutional investors. Kelejian & Mukerji (2015) 
analyzed 110 most traded companies from S&P 500 and studied the variance of return 
volatility for 35 industries. The result indicated that HFT resulted in the increase of 
volatility having a huge effect on the income of non-algorithm traders. There could also 
be a possibility of non-algorithm traders losing confidence which may result in avoiding 
the market completely. 
 
3.3.1 Liquidity 
 
Liquidity is considered an important aspect in financial markets. Market participant 
always prefer a highly liquid market as it leads to swift execution of orders. The role of 
algorithm trading in providing liquidity is still very crucial. CFTC report on the flash 
crash has clearly indicated that a liquidity crisis emerged in the market due to the selling 
pressure from sell algorithm and HFT. Institutional investors always have their trading 
strategies build around highly liquid markets. The role of algorithm trading in providing 
liquidity is still quite controversial as there is still no consensus as to whether algorithm 
trading is responsible for providing or sucking out liquidity from within the market.  
 
Carrion (2013) analyzed the participation of high frequency traders on 120 stocks of the 
NASDAQ stock exchange. The result suggested that HFT works in both ways when it 
comes to providing liquidity. It injects liquidity when it is scarce but is also responsible 
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for withdrawing liquidity when it is in excess. Brogaard, Hendershott and Riordan 
(2014) have similar view in terms of liquidity while studying the impact of HFT on 
price efficiency. More evidence is provided by Hendershott, Jones and Menkveld 
(2011) to prove that algorithm trading does help in improving liquidity. The study uses 
autoquoting as an instrumental variable approach to demonstrate the impact of AT on 
liquidity. The result indicate that algorithm trading activity has been constantly 
increasing over the years and also increased liquidity within the market. 
 
3.3.2 Market Quality 
 
There are various factors considered when an investor decides to invest in a particular 
instrument. These factors may vary based on investors risk and return. The market 
quality could prove to be an important deciding factor for an investor when selecting a 
particular avenue for investment. Market quality can be judged on various parameters 
such as liquidity, low bid-ask spread and high volumes. The impact of HFT on market 
quality has been debated in a lot of research papers.  
 
Market efficiency is used as a parameter by Carrion (2013) to study the impact of HFT 
on market quality. The result indicate a positive relation between HFT and price 
efficient. However the result does not justify that an increase in price efficiency is due 
to HFT.  Scholtus, Dijk and Frijns (2014) have used liquidity and volatility as a main 
parameter for market quality to study the impact of algorithm trading on market quality 
around macroeconomic news announcement. The results suggest that liquidity and 
volumes both increase immediately after the news announcement due to high 
algorithmic trading activity. 
 
3.3.3  Volatility 
 
The volatility of a stock is one of the parameters considered by most investors before 
investing. Empirical evidence from previous literature have suggested that there could 
be positive and negative correlation between stock market return and volatility. 
However the role of HFT is reducing volatility could be of prime importance. Most of 
the research papers suggest HFT has been able to curb high volatility.  Hagströmer and 
Norden (2013) have done an event study to study the effect of HFT on volatility. They 
have used minimum tick size as a medium to study volatility.  Their findings indicate 
that HFT does lead to reduction in short term volatility.  
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3.3.4 High Frequency Trading Strategies 
 
Algorithm trading are being used to cater to specific demands of the investor 
community. Various strategies are developed to suit investors need. Profitability may 
not be the only reason for migrating into algorithm trading. Some investors also use it to 
sell huge quantity of shares in a systematic way while other could use it to get an 
advantage over time due to low latency available in algorithm trading. Statistical 
arbitrage is the most widely used HFT strategy. Serbera and Paumard (2016) throws 
light on various HFT strategies such as mean reversion and pair trading while analyzing 
the fall of HFT due to intense competition and fall in profitability.   
 
The impact of algorithm trading on non-algorithm trading investors has been studied by 
Kelejian and Mukerji (2016).  They use spatial econometric modelling to focus on the 
impact of statistical arbitrage strategy to measure the transfer of volatility across 
different stocks. The result indicate that after the introduction of HFT there has been an 
overall decrease in volatility spill over across various industries. Hagströmer and 
Nordén (2013) have differentiated HFT strategies into two main categories market-
making strategies and opportunistic trading to study the diversity among HFT traders. 
Through their study they analyze the different characteristics of HFT and also study 
their impact on short term volatility. Their findings reveal that majority of the market 
participants utilize market-making strategies. The result also suggest that market 
making strategies dominate over opportunistic strategies as they are beneficial in terms 
of reducing volatility and prove to be far more inexpensive.  
 
3.3.5  Speed 
 
Algorithm trading could not have played a vital role without taking into the account the 
aspect of speed. Trading speed has considerably increased over the years due to 
technological advancement. But algorithm trading have been responsible to speed up 
trades even further. This poses a problem to non-algorithm traders as they find it hard to 
compete with speeds used by computer driven algorithmic software. Due to high speeds 
the trading time have also reduce greatly bringing in extreme low latency. Serbera and 
Paumard (2016) have noted in their paper that there are various factors involved to 
achieve speeds of low latency and that trade executions timing are reducing 
considerably and will be reduced to nanoseconds. They have also suggested that in the 
future speeds could hit the speed of light which would be the maximum speed possible 
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after which there could be no more technological advancement to reach any higher 
speeds limits.  
 
Scholtus, Dijk and Frijns (2014) have taken into consideration the speed aspect of HFT 
around macroeconomic news announcement. They use Wilcoxon signed rank test to 
determine returns between trades that executed instantly and trades with small delays.  
The results indicate that there is a significant decrease in returns for delays in executions 
versus executions instantaneously. Slower speeds of 10 milliseconds, 300 milliseconds 
or even a second can cause returns to reduce by 0.19%, 1.94% or 3.90% annually. They 
also analyze the impact of speed on various scenarios such as days of high and low 
volatility, time of news arrival and the level of the news announcement. The analysis 
conclude that on high volatile days delays of 400 milliseconds and more lead to a loss 
for event-based trading strategies. The result for high impact news announcements is 
2.87% annually for a one second delay while a large news surprise lead to decrease of 
2.23 bps in comparison to 0.83 for a small surprise for the same time frame.  
 
3.3.6 Profitability 
 
Most HFT investors are working towards gaining an upper hand in trading. But the most 
important reason to migrate to HFT is to have an increase in profitability. The role of 
profitability still has a lot of concerns as to how much excess returns do HFT actually 
make over non HFT traders. Switching to HFT may not be the key to higher profits as it 
also requires the strategies to work. Profitability may also get reduced as the 
competition around HFT increases. With increase in HFT players it has become difficult 
to gain an edge as each trader tries to gain competitive advantage over one another.   
 
Carrion (2013) has focused on distinguishing the source of profits for HFT. The need 
for getting a clear understanding of the source of profitability was to rule out the 
possibility of earning profits from spreads instead of gaining profits from market timing. 
VWAP difference is used to calculate profits from HFT. The findings reveal that HFT 
traders earn $2,623.84 on daily basis. The profits earned are from liquidity-demanding 
and liquidity-supplying trades. The estimations draws a conclusion that profits are 
earned of $3,292.61 when HFT supply liquidity while losses are made of $691.54 when 
HFT demand liquidity.  The paper also deals with profitability through market timing. 
Intraday return was calculated by using two different time duration called short-term 
timing performance and intraday market timing performance. The result suggest that 
43 
 
between the two different time frames the performance for intraday market timing is 
better when it is compared against the previous.  
 
The source of HFT profitability is extremely important to actually differentiate whether 
profits are earned through HFT as the results could also suggest that profits are earned 
through other sources which could clearly indicate that migrating to HFT alone could 
not lead to higher profitability. Menkveld (2013) also has tried to analyze the source of 
profitability by considering various factors. The study classifies HFT into two different 
parameters and associates them with a friendly approach and a hostile approach. The 
friendly approach takes into consideration HFT trying to form new market makers while 
the hostile approach considers HFT taking a very aggressive approach.  The parameters 
are classified into positioning profit and net spread.  Their findings reveals most of the 
trades turn out to be passive. The traders tend to earn on spreads but lose out on 
position. The duration aspect is also considered and the findings favors positions that 
last less than five seconds.  
 
 
3.4 Regulatory Requirement 
 
Regulation forms a core aspects of any financial system. The financial system has to be 
sound and should function without any hindrances from any kind of manipulative 
practices.  The regulatory authority have to safeguard the interest of the investors and 
make sure every financial institution have to comply with the rules and regulation set by 
them for the smooth functioning of the financial markets. Investor’s confidence is the 
key for smooth functioning of the financial markets. Manipulative practices, scams, 
financial crisis and events like flash crash lower investor’s confidence who are then 
become very hesitant to enter the markets again. The regulations set by the regulatory 
authority are quite stringent but there are times when they fail to provide safety to the 
investors either because of regulation being outdated, loopholes in the system and new 
technological advancement making the need to keep updating the rules and regulation a 
high priority. Strong governing bodies forcing the companies to adopt to ethical 
practices could help in building a robust financial system. The event of flash crash led to 
various debated across the investor community questioning the failure of the regulatory 
authority to prevent such an event.  
 
Brewer, Cvitanic and Plott (2013) focus on the role of regulatory authority in getting the 
situation under control immediately after the flash crash. They use a stimulated 
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approach to study the impact of alternative policies in bringing about stability to the 
market. The stimulated approach is a direct replication of the actual flash which allows 
them to study various factors. They considered various factors that could help in getting 
liquidity back to the markets and maintaining the prices back to normal levels and 
helping to restore stability in the market. After considering various alternatives they 
have provided detailed analysis of the factors that could work best in getting the market 
to normal level during the event of a flash crash.  The regulatory intervention could help 
provide the necessary support the market needs in bringing about overall stability and 
give a direction to the market. 
 
The event of flash crash clearly pointed out the need for better regulation to prevent 
such events from reoccurring again. Immediately after the flash crash the SEC/CFTC 
report (2010) suggests a lot of new implementation were brought in the counter such a 
crash in the future. The individual security halt was brought in if the stock experiences 
high volatility this could help in isolating only that particular stock from the overall 
market. The rule was focused on stalling the entire market now is extended to individual 
stocks. In the initial phrase only a few stocks were used for the purpose of testing but 
now it is extended to wider range of stocks that trade on various indexes.  Another 
important issue of concern is that of broken trades. The report suggests that only those 
trades were cancelled that were executed at a price limit exceeding 60%  making the 
process unfair. To bring about a change in the system the SEC have defined a new set of 
standard procedure that has to be followed in case of a broken trades. Thus making it 
clear across the investor’s community about the trades that can qualify to be considered 
broken. Other measures are also being tested one such measure is limit up/limit/down 
that defines a specific parameter and trading outside those parameters is not accessible. 
The upside of the flash crash event has been the implementation of new regulatory 
procedures and the steps taken to bring about SEC in countering such an event to take 
place again.  
 
 
3.5  Circuit Breaking Mechanism 
 
Circuit breakers have become very important in the stock markets. Circuit breakers halt 
trading if the index or stocks have reached a certain level.  It is generally used if there is 
extreme movement in any direction. It is a technique generally used to reduce volatility 
and stabilize the markets.  Circuit breakers are placed at different levels by the stock 
exchange. Generally trading is halted for a specific time period and then trading is 
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resumed back. But there is a possibility that if the circuit breakers are pressed in the 
latter half of the day the markets could be shut for the remainder of the day.  Every 
stock exchange has its own regulation in regard to circuit breakers. Mostly it’s the 
regulator who decides the level for the circuit breaker and exchanges have to adhere to 
the regulation.  The role of circuit breakers during the flash crash has been studies in 
various previous literature.   
 
After the flash crash event Brewer, Cvitanic and Plott (2013) have studied and 
suggested various alternatives techniques that could lead to stability in the market. They 
analyze different type of circuit breakers but find them only as a temporary measure in 
contrast to bringing a complete change in market structure. They suggest intervention is 
helpful only if it’s a temporary spike in prices but in case of fundamental change of 
market structure it could lead to hindrance to the overall transitioning.  
 
Chakrabaty, Corwin and Panayides (2011) try to concentrate on finding the advantages 
associated with trading on alternative avenues during a trading halt. Their analysis 
concentrated on trading halts that took place on NYSE.  They give insights into the 
benefits of resuming trading on other avenues during halts on the NYSE. Even though 
there are advantages the cost and volatility are significantly high as compared to non-
halted trading days. 
 
Rule 80A has been closely monitored by Goldstein (2015) to study the reduction of 
volatility in the stock market. He gives a brief description of Rule 80A and 80B that is 
related to circuit breaking mechanism on the NYSE that could enable delinking of the 
futures and equities market. He analyses intraday data and studies the impact of 
volatility before and after rule 80A has been implemented. Due to various issues caused 
by possible smoothing and no proper convergence to the data used, GARCH model is 
not implemented but instead a different approach is estimated. The research paper does 
find evidence of reduction as well as some effect on volatility due to delinking of the 
equities and futures market.  The market crash of 27-28 October was covered briefly by 
Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) by drawing an event timeline.  While 80A was imposed 
only on 28 October both rules came into effect on October 27. 
 
Extreme market movements are generally beyond the investor’s control. If circuit 
breakers come into effect it becomes extremely challenging for investors to find better 
alternatives. During a flash crash there is a high tendency of stocks or index’s being hit 
by circuit breaker so it is always beneficial to find a concrete solutions to counter such 
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problems. Goldstein and Kavajecz (2004) have studied various trading strategies when 
circuit breaker are implemented by the exchanges and during high volatile market 
movements. The analysis is focused on the actions of the investor during the high 
volatile days of 27-28 October, 1997 and is compared with non-volatile days.  The three 
main parameters considered was trading platform, order type and the time of investor’s 
reaction. These parameters played a vital role for investors while they form key 
strategies. The trading floor was found more preferred by the traders over trading 
through electronic form. They suggested that market participants alter their strategies 
while prices came close to the circuit breakers and their decisions are mostly based on 
flexibility.  
 
A different set of research that also deal with trading strategies was done by Cho, 
Russell, Tiao and Tsay (2003) and  have concentrated their study on daily price limits 
and their effects which also covers the magnet effect. For their study they consider data 
from Taiwan Stock Exchange as the exchange has high volatility and low price limits. 
They have used GMM methodology to study the magnet effect. The magnet effect is 
visible on the ceiling price but not on the floor price. For finding a concrete conclusion 
that the magnet effect is not due to momentum further analysis was done and the results 
suggest weak evidence of momentum effect. In their study they have formulated various 
strategies to benefit from the magnet effect but also found the transaction cost to be very 
high. In order to prevent from profits lowering due to high transaction cost they devised 
a combination of a threshold limit and the number of stock to invest to come up with a 
strategy that could beat all other benchmark combinations. 
 
The first use of circuit breakers and the various levels at which they are implemented 
are mentioned by Ackert, Church and Jayaraman (2001).  The initial use of circuit 
breakers came in the October 1988 and was based on threshold limit of 250 and 400 
points. This was soon changed to 350 and 550 on January 1997. On February 1998 a 
new circuit breaking system was implemented that would come into effect if the price 
would cross a certain percentage limit. The percentage limits were set a 10%, 20% and 
30% and these limit had certain implication if they were hit at certain time of the day.  
They focused their study on circuit breaking mechanism and their effect on the three 
main components namely price, volume and profitability by using the experimental 
market setting. Analyzing volumes gives a clear indication whether circuit breakers do 
affect trading and the findings suggest it does significantly. Profitability remains 
unaffected by trading but traders tend to trade at a faster pace if they feel a circuit 
breaker will be hit.  
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Circuit breakers are quite common when the whole market is shut down for a specific 
period of time. But a rule on NYSE also permits shutting down of a single stock while 
trading can continue seamlessly on other stock and indexes. Jiang, McInish and Upson 
(2009) have concentrated their study on stocks that are related through parameters such 
as return, volatility, volume and spreads that continue trading during a halt on a 
particular stock. They found evidence of liquidity and price being affected on 
informationally related stocks that continue trading while trading is halted in a particular 
stock. Also the halt brought an increase in transaction costs.  
 
Transaction costs were also considered by Christie, Corwin and Harris (2002) while 
studying trading halts on the NASDAQ stock exchange. The focus their research on 
trading halts caused due news events while considering their impact on stock prices, 
cost of transaction and trading activity. They have used signed-rank test to analyze the 
change in volatility, transaction cost and trading activity caused due to trading halts and 
delayed opening. They have mentioned about the trading mechanism used by NASDAQ 
that initiates trades after a 90 minutes quotation period in case the halt has been lifted 
later than 4.00 pm for the previous day. This method differentiates itself from opening 
days where NASDAQ open after a 5 minute quotation period.  The analysis indicate 
that trades after a 5 minute quotation period tend to have higher volatility and 
transaction costs as compared to reopening after a 90 minute quotation period. On 
volumes front higher volumes were noticed after a 90 minute quotation period than a 5 
minute quotation period. 
 
The effectiveness of circuit breakers has been quite debatable as some studies have 
proven it to be very effective by lowering volatility and giving opportunity to investor to 
understand the situation more closely while others believe it hampers stock movement 
and causes price inefficiency. These arguments have been studied very closely by 
Corwin and Lipson (2000) while concentrating on the effects of trading halts on the 
liquidity and order flow of the NYSE market. They have categorized their analysis 
based on two different types of halts namely news halt and order imbalance. An 
important trend noticed during the analysis suggest an increase in the order submission 
even if the trading has been halted which gives a clear indication of the eagerness of 
entering the market immediately when the market restarts normal trading. They have 
also done a thorough analysis of the limit order book to find evidence of variation in 
liquidity and volatility. Signed-rank test have been used to study trading activity during 
halts and determine their impact on liquidity. Another important aspect that they have 
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considered in their study is the connection between volatility and liquidity during halts 
by using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test.  
 
A study having a focus on volume and volatility is covered by Lee, Ready and Seguin 
(1994). They study trading halts on the New York Stock Exchange and their impact on 
stock volatility and volumes. They have stressed on differentiating between trading 
cessation and the process of price discovery and whether their combination does lead to 
reducing volatility and volumes. In their paper they take into consideration news events 
and categorize them into six different categories as most of the previous literature have 
suggested a relation between news events and trading halts. The intention of a trading 
halt is to reduce the panic in the market but they find this does not serve the purpose as 
there is an increase in volumes and volatility immediately after trading is resumed.  
 
The results obtained by Lee, Ready and Seguin are quite similar to the finding from 
Subrahmanyam (1994) who concentrates more on the relation between Circuit breakers 
and volatility. He suggests that even though it is a common notion that circuit breakers 
usually calm the market down and give investors time to take stock of the situation his 
results prove it could tend to be more a costly affair as it could lead to price 
discrepancies and transition in volumes into other markets. The resulting action is from 
analyzing a situation between two different markets one from the more dominant market 
with high liquidity and the other called the satellite market.  
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4. Data and Methodology  
 
 
4.1 Data 
 
The need to find impact of flash crash makes it critical to understand the returns of 
different stocks for an indepth analysis. Since flash crash is an event we can study the 
effect it has on market structure before, during and after the crash. Doing an event study 
will help to find a clear picture and a wider perspective of the aftermath of the flash 
crash. For this study the methodology aspect is adopted from Boulton, Braga-Alves and 
Kulchania (2014). For their study they have considered two set for stocks each set 
consisting of 29 stocks and have divided them into base sample and match sample. The 
base sample consist of stocks that had trades executed but eventually led to the 
cancellation while the match sample did not have any cancelled executions. The stocks 
were matched on the basis of certain criteria.  The next step involved them using three-
factor model documented by Fama and French (1993) to find the abnormal returns. The 
data used by them consists of 255 trading days that ended 46 days before the flash 
crash.   
 
The data in the thesis contains two sets of 21 stocks that are similar to the stock 
selection of Boulton, Braga-Alves and Kulchania (2014) with the exception of 8 stocks 
due to data unavailability. The data consists of daily data before, after and on the day of 
the flash crash. The data has taken into account two stock indices that includes Dow 
Jones Industrial Average that was highly affected on the day of the flash crash. 
Similarly S&P 500 and the volatility index “VIX” was also considered with a similar 
time frame. The data is taken over a wider time frame consisting from March 2009 until 
December 2011. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
  Mean       Median     
  
Base 
sample 
Matched 
sample Difference   
Base 
sample 
Matched 
sample Difference 
Market 
Capitalization 
(mUSD) 34,573.79 37,888.84 -3,315.05 
 
5,663.73 5,447.48 216.25 
Price 34.94 31.12 3.82 
 
31.87 27.06 4.81 
Turnover* 5,993.15 8,682.64 -2,689.49 
 
3,773.10 5,280.40 -1,507.30 
Volatility (%) 1.63 1.69 -0.05  1.26 1.28 -0.03 
* Number of shares, millions. 
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Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for the base sample and the matched sample. 
The market capitalization for base sample is over $34 million with a share price of 
34.94 and return on volatility is 1.63%.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Intraday return for E-Mini,VIX and SPY during the Flash Crash on May 
06,2010. 
 
 
Figure 5: Abnormal return for S&P 500 index for 22-04-10 – 20-05-10. 
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Figure 6: Abnormal return for S&P 500 index inclusive of VIX for 22-04-10 – 20-05-
10. 
 
 
Figure 7: Abnormal return for Dow Jones Industrial Average for 22-04-10 – 20-05-10. 
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Figure 8: Abnormal return for Dow Jones inclusive of VIX for 22-04-10 – 20-05-10. 
 
 
Figure 4 provides us a graph of the intraday return for E-mini, SPY and VIX. Figure 5, 
6, 7 and 8 gives a graphical representation of the abnormal returns for the base sample 
& matched sample for S&P 500, S&P 500 inclusive of VIX, DJIA and DJIA inclusive 
of VIX. The figures provides a clear indication that the abnormal returns for the base 
sample and matched sample moved in the same direction till a certain extend before the 
flash crash. After the crash the scenario changed as the movement between the base 
sample and the matched sample started to move in the opposite direction. On the day of 
the flash crash and the immediate next day we could see the deflection towards the 
opposite direction the maximum. This deflection could be attributed mainly due to the 
cancellations of trades undertaken by Nasdaq and NYSE Arca.  
  
 
4.2 Methodology 
 
In order to analyze the impact of the flash crash on the stock prices this paper follows 
Boulton, Braga-Alves and Kulchania (2014) methodology. The entire sample consists of 
US stocks from the NYSE. The paper divides the sample of stocks into two groups: 
base sample (stocks which consists of executed trades on May 06, 2010 and respectively 
cancelled by either Nasdaq or NYSE Arca) and matched sample (stocks which are 
matched with the base sample based on the price, turnover measure the volume of daily 
traded shares, market capitalization and volatility. The sample contains 21 for base 
sample and 21 stocks for matched samples as indicated in the below table.  
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Table 2: List of companies in base sample and matched sample 
Base sample     Matched sample   
Company Ticker   Company Ticker 
3M Co. MMM 
 
McDonald's Corp. MCD 
American Tower Corporation AMT 
 
St. Jude Medical Inc. STJ 
B & G Foods Inc. BGS 
 
Comfort Systems USA Inc. FIX 
Brown & Brown Inc. BRO 
 
Ingram Micro Inc. IM 
CenterPoint Energy, Inc. CNP 
 
NiSource Inc. N 
CenturyTel, Inc. CTL 
 
FirstEnergy Corp. FE 
Cenveo Inc. CVO 
 
The E.W. Scripps Company SSP 
Clearwater Paper Corporation CLW 
 
Piper Jaffray Companies PJC 
Eagle Materials Inc. EXP 
 
GATX Corp. GMT 
Exelon Corporation EXC 
 
Walgreen Co. WAG 
Health Net, Inc. HNT 
 
Superior Energy Services, 
Inc. SPN 
Hewlett-Packard Company HPQ 
 
The Coca-Cola Company KO 
The Interpublic Group of 
Companies, Inc. IPG 
 
PulteGroup, Inc. PHM 
Merck & Co. Inc. MRK 
 
Wells Fargo & Company WFC 
ONEOK Inc. OKE 
 
Hormel Foods Corp. HRL 
Oxford Industries Inc. OXM 
 
Trex Co. Inc. TREX 
Philip Morris International, Inc. PM 
 
Abbot Laboratories ABT 
Procter & Gamble Co. PG 
 
Johnson & Johnson JNJ 
Quest Diagnostics Inc. DGX 
 
ITT Corporation ITT 
Sotheby's  BID 
 
Tempur Pedic International TPX 
United Technologies Corp. UTX   
Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation OXY 
 
 
The period under analysis is 242 trading days ending 50 days prior to the flash crash in 
order to avoid any biases which may be caused by the flash crash. In order to calculate 
the returns of each individual stock the below mentioned formula has been used: 
 
(1)                    Rj,t=Pi,t/Pi,t-1 
 
where : 
 
Rj,t  is the return of stock j on the t day; 
 
Pj,t  is the price of stock j on the t day; 
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Pj,t-1 is the price of stock j on the t-1 (previous) day; 
 
Moving forward the analysis of the abnormal returns is based on the Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor model and Cahart’s (1997) momentum factor. The model used for 
calculating abnormal returns takes the following form: 
 
(2)                    𝑅𝑗𝑡 =  𝛼𝑗 + 𝛽𝑗𝑅𝑚𝑡 + 𝑠𝑗𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑗𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑢𝑗𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 + 𝜀𝑗𝑡  
 
 
where 𝑅𝑗𝑡 is the stock return for 𝑗
𝑡ℎ stock on the day t,  return on market index on day t 
is denoted by 𝑅𝑚𝑡, 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 indicates the average return on small-firm stocks minus the 
average return on large-firm stocks on day t, HML indicates the average return on high 
book-to-market stocks minus the average return on low book to market-to –market 
stocks on day t, and 𝑈𝑀𝐷𝑡 is the average return on high prior return portfolios minus the 
average return on low prior return portfolios. 𝛽𝑗, 𝑠𝑗 , ℎ𝑗 , 𝑢𝑗  measure a stock’s sensitivity 
to the market, size, book-to-market, and momentum factors, respectively.   
 
In order to calculate daily abnormal returns for a stock j on day t the analysis is based on 
the below formula; 
 
(3)                       ARjt =  Rjt − (αĵ + βĵRmt + sĵSMBt + ĥjHMLt + uĵUMDt) 
 
 
Where αĵ, βĵ, sĵ, hĵ, and uĵ are the Ordinary Least Squares estimated from equation 2. 
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5. RESULTS 
 
 
The paper by Boulton, Braga-Alves and Kulchania (2014) give us a broad perspective 
of the change in shareholders wealth due to the flash crash. The flash crash that 
occurred on May 06, 2010 did crash and recover in a span of few minutes but it manage 
to erode the shareholders wealth substantially. The paper created a distinction between 
two different set of samples one with trades that have been executed but cancelled by 
Nasdaq or NYSE Arca while the other group is matched with companies based on 
similar criteria who’s trades have not been cancelled.  The analysis done works on 
similar ground by finding the abnormal returns and taking a closer look at impact of 
shareholders wealth days after the impact of the flash crash. To get a better 
understanding of the impact of the flash crash on investor’s capital the paper takes into 
consideration the abnormal returns for the base sample and the matched sample. Four 
cases have been studied in this research that includes Dow Jones Industrial Average and 
S&P 500. Dow Jones Industrial Average was one of the most affected indexes in the 
crash so it was eminent for its consideration into the analysis. The research also takes 
into account the role of the volatility index during the crash by adding VIX as an 
explanatory variable to the regression. As we have noted in Figure 1 that VIX was up by 
22.5%. So apart from the DJIA and S&P 500 the analysis also concentrates on DJIA 
and S&P 500 with the inclusion of VIX.  
 
Table 3 provides us the abnormal returns for S&P 500 index. The mean abnormal return 
and the percentage of positive returns for a period of 21 days have been noted below. To 
the bottom we have the cumulative abnormal return over eight window period starting 
from 10 days before the event of the flash crash to 10 days after the crash.  The results 
for S&P 500 Index on the day of the flash crash indicate negative returns of -0.35% for 
the base sample. The negative return continues on the next day and is also statically 
significant which could also possibly indicate low investor sentiments. Most of the 
stocks on the base sample have negative abnormal returns for the window period of [0, 
+1]. The cumulative abnormal return for the window period [0, +1] is -1.10%. The 
results for matched samples does not provide any significant results.  
 
Table 4 provides us the abnormal returns for S&P 500 including VIX. The results on the 
day of the flash crash indicate negative returns of -0.27% for the base sample. The 
negative return continues on the next day and the day after. Most of the stocks on the 
base sample have negative abnormal returns for the window period of [0, +1]. The 
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cumulative abnormal return for the window period [0, +1] is -0.87%. The results for 
matched samples does not provide any significant results.  
 
 
Table 3: Abnormal returns for S&P 500 index 
 
 
Base sample   Matched sample   Difference 
 
Abnormal 
Returns % Positive   
Abnormal 
Returns % Positive     
22-04-10 -0.711 57.143 
 
0.019 52.381 
 
0.730* 
23-04-10 -0.027 52.381 
 
-0.414 57.143 
 
-0.387 
26-04-10       -0.450 *  66.667 
 
-0.832*** 80.952 
 
-0.382 
27-04-10 -0.064 61.905 
 
0.344 47.619 
 
0.409 
28-04-10 -0.029 52.381 
 
0.320 38.095 
 
0.349 
29-04-10 -0.063 47.619 
 
0.297 38.095 
 
0.360 
30-04-10 0.518 23.810 
 
0.803 47.619 
 
0.285 
03-05-10 -0.069 47.619 
 
-0.344 52.381 
 
-0.275 
04-05-10 0.099 38.095 
 
-0.134 47.619 
 
-0.232 
05-05-10 0.591* 38.095 
 
-0.560 42.857 
 
-1.150 
06-05-10 -0.352 61.905 
 
0.275 38.095 
 
0.626 
07-05-10 -0.753* 71.429 
 
0.427 47.619 
 
1.179** 
10-05-10 0.142 57.143 
 
-0.260 61.905 
 
-0.402 
11-05-10 0.074 42.857 
 
0.257 42.857 
 
0.183 
12-05-10 -0.235 52.381 
 
-0.064 57.143 
 
0.170 
13-05-10 0.311 28.571 
 
0.148 47.619 
 
-0.162 
14-05-10 0.066 42.857 
 
0.162 47.619 
 
0.095 
17-05-10 -0.178 57.143 
 
-0.002 52.381 
 
0.175 
18-05-10 0.024 47.619 
 
-0.236 61.905 
 
-0.260 
19-05-10 0.119 47.619 
 
-0.411* 71.429 
 
-0.531** 
20-05-10 -0.057 52.381 
 
-0.055 52.381 
 
0.002 
        CAR 
       [0,-10] -0.557 50.216 
 
-0.225 50.649 
 
-0.333 
[0,-5] 0.724 57.143 
 
0.338 55.556 
 
0.386 
[0,-3] 0.269 53.571 
 
-0.763 54.762 
 
1.032 
[0,-1] 0.239 50.000 
 
-0.285 59.524 
 
0.524 
[0,1] -1.104 33.333 
 
0.701 57.143 
 
-1.805* 
[0,3] -0.889 41.667 
 
0.698 52.381 
 
-1.587 
[0,5] -0.812 47.619 
 
0.782 50.794 
 
-1.595 
[0,10] -0.838 48.918   0.239 47.186   -1.076 
*** Statistically significant at 1% 
** Statistically significant at 5% 
* Statistically significant at 10% 
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Table 4: Abnormal returns for S&P 500 index inclusive of VIX 
 
 
 
      
 
Base sample   Matched sample   Difference 
 
Abnormal 
Returns % Positive   
Abnormal 
Returns % Positive     
22-04-10 -0.692 42.857 
 
0.023 47.619 
 
0.716* 
23-04-10 0.008 52.381 
 
-0.393 42.857 
 
-0.402 
26-04-10 -0.398 33.333 
 
-0.803*** 23.810 
 
-0.405 
27-04-10 0.089 47.619 
 
0.441 61.905 
 
0.352 
28-04-10 -0.083 42.857 
 
0.288 61.905 
 
0.371 
29-04-10 -0.154 47.619 
 
0.246 61.905 
 
0.400 
30-04-10 0.612* 76.190 
 
0.861 57.143 
 
0.250 
03-05-10 -0.098 52.381 
 
-0.362 47.619 
 
-0.264 
04-05-10 0.149 61.905 
 
-0.101 57.143 
 
-0.250 
05-05-10 0.612 61.905 
 
-0.555 52.381 
 
-1.167 
06-05-10 -0.268 38.095 
 
0.330 57.143 
 
0.598 
07-05-10 -0.601 42.857 
 
0.521 71.429 
 
1.123** 
10-05-10 -0.059 42.857 
 
-0.377 33.333 
 
-0.318 
11-05-10 0.052 57.143 
 
0.244 57.143 
 
0.191 
12-05-10 -0.279 42.857 
 
-0.093 42.857 
 
0.186 
13-05-10 0.315 71.429 
 
0.146 47.619 
 
-0.169 
14-05-10 0.137 61.905 
 
0.209 52.381 
 
0.072 
17-05-10 -0.180 42.857 
 
-0.007 52.381 
 
0.173 
18-05-10 0.053 52.381 
 
-0.219 33.333 
 
-0.273 
19-05-10 0.140 52.381 
 
-0.398* 33.333 
 
-0.538** 
20-05-10 -0.007 38.095 
 
-0.021 47.619 
 
-0.014 
        CAR 
       [0,-10] -0.223 50.649 
 
-0.024 51.948 
 
-0.198 
[0,-5] 0.853 56.349 
 
0.419 55.556 
 
0.434 
[0,-3] 0.395 53.571 
 
-0.688 53.571 
 
1.083 
[0,-1] 0.344 50.000 
 
-0.225 54.762 
 
0.569 
[0,1] -0.869 40.476 
 
0.851 64.286 
 
-1.721* 
[0,3] -0.876 45.238 
 
0.718 54.762 
 
-1.594 
[0,5] -0.840 49.206 
 
0.770 51.587 
 
-1.610 
[0,10] -0.696 49.351   0.335 48.052   -1.031 
*** Statistically significant at 1% 
** Statistically significant at 5% 
* Statistically significant at 10% 
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Table 5: Abnormal returns for Dow Jones Industrial Average 
        
 
Base sample   Matched sample   Difference 
 
Abnormal 
Returns % Positive   
Abnormal 
Returns % Positive     
22-04-10 -0.703 42.857 
 
-0.062 47.619 
 
0.641* 
23-04-10 -0.063 47.619 
 
-0.368 42.857 
 
-0.305 
26-04-10 -0.098 47.619 
 
-0.420 42.857 
 
-0.322 
27-04-10 0.044 38.095 
 
0.616* 61.905 
 
0.572 
28-04-10 -0.137 47.619 
 
0.156 52.381 
 
0.294 
29-04-10 -0.056 52.381 
 
0.269 57.143 
 
0.325 
30-04-10 0.461 71.429 
 
0.836 52.381 
 
0.375 
03-05-10 0.124 66.667 
 
-0.245 47.619 
 
-0.369 
04-05-10 0.144 61.905 
 
0.055 57.143 
 
-0.088 
05-05-10 0.596 61.905 
 
-0.604 52.381 
 
-1.201 
06-05-10 -0.642 33.333 
 
0.123 47.619 
 
0.765 
07-05-10 -0.825 28.571 
 
0.432 52.381 
 
1.257** 
10-05-10 0.210 42.857 
 
-0.557 38.095 
 
-0.768 
11-05-10 0.114 57.143 
 
0.271 57.143 
 
0.157 
12-05-10 -0.029 61.905 
 
0.086 52.381 
 
0.115 
13-05-10 0.391* 76.190 
 
0.214 57.143 
 
-0.177 
14-05-10 0.152 61.905 
 
0.399** 80.952 
 
0.246 
17-05-10 -0.237 38.095 
 
-0.024 47.619 
 
0.213 
18-05-10 0.181 57.143 
 
-0.049 52.381 
 
-0.230 
19-05-10 -0.076 52.381 
 
-0.611*** 28.571 
 
-0.535** 
20-05-10 -0.206 38.095 
 
-0.079 52.381 
 
0.127 
        CAR 
       [0,-10] -0.331 51.948 
 
0.355 51.082 
 
-0.686 
[0,-5] 0.626 57.937 
 
0.433 52.381 
 
0.193 
[0,-3] 0.221 55.952 
 
-0.671 51.190 
 
0.893 
[0,-1] -0.046 47.619 
 
-0.481 50.000 
 
0.435 
[0,1] -1.467* 30.952 
 
0.555 50.000 
 
-2.023** 
[0,3] -1.143 40.476 
 
0.269 48.810 
 
-1.412 
[0,5] -0.781 50.000 
 
0.570 50.794 
 
-1.351 
[0,10] -0.966 49.784   0.205 51.515   -1.172 
*** Statistically significant at 1% 
** Statistically significant at 5% 
* Statistically significant at 10% 
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Table 6: Abnormal returns for Dow Jones Industrial Average inclusive of VIX 
        
 
Base sample   Matched sample   Difference 
 
Abnormal 
Returns % Positive   
Abnormal 
Returns % Positive     
22-04-10 -0.693 42.857 
 
-0.072 47.619 
 
0.621* 
23-04-10 -0.040 47.619 
 
-0.395 42.857 
 
-0.355 
26-04-10 -0.078 47.619 
 
-0.445 42.857 
 
-0.367 
27-04-10 0.132 47.619 
 
0.489 61.905 
 
0.357 
28-04-10 -0.166 38.095 
 
0.195 57.143 
 
0.361 
29-04-10 -0.111 47.619 
 
0.342 61.905 
 
0.453 
30-04-10 0.519 76.190 
 
0.753 57.143 
 
0.234 
03-05-10 0.100 66.667 
 
-0.216 47.619 
 
-0.316 
04-05-10 0.172 61.905 
 
0.017 57.143 
 
-0.155 
05-05-10 0.609* 61.905 
 
-0.613 52.381 
 
-1.222 
06-05-10 -0.585 28.571 
 
0.038 38.095 
 
0.624 
07-05-10 -0.732* 38.095 
 
0.296 57.143 
 
1.028** 
10-05-10 0.089 52.381 
 
-0.403 28.571 
 
-0.492 
11-05-10 0.099 57.143 
 
0.291 61.905 
 
0.192 
12-05-10 -0.062 57.143 
 
0.135 57.143 
 
0.196 
13-05-10 0.390* 76.190 
 
0.221 57.143 
 
-0.169 
14-05-10 0.192 61.905 
 
0.340* 71.429 
 
0.148 
17-05-10 -0.236 38.095 
 
-0.018 52.381 
 
0.218 
18-05-10 0.193 52.381 
 
-0.065 52.381 
 
-0.258 
19-05-10 -0.057 52.381 
 
-0.639*** 28.571 
 
-0.582** 
20-05-10 -0.174 38.095 
 
-0.127 42.857 
 
0.047 
        CAR 
       [0,-10] -0.140 51.515 
 
0.095 51.515 
 
-0.235 
[0,-5] 0.704 57.143 
 
0.322 52.381 
 
0.382 
[0,-3] 0.295 54.762 
 
-0.774 48.810 
 
1.069 
[0,-1] 0.023 45.238 
 
-0.575 45.238 
 
0.598 
[0,1] -1.317* 33.333 
 
0.335 47.619 
 
-1.652 
[0,3] -1.129 44.048 
 
0.223 46.429 
 
-1.352 
[0,5] -0.801 51.587 
 
0.578 50.000 
 
-1.379 
[0,10] -0.884 50.216   0.070 49.784   -0.954 
*** Statistically significant at 1% 
** Statistically significant at 5% 
* Statistically significant at 10% 
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Table 5 provides us the abnormal returns for Dow Jones Industrial Average.  The results 
for Dow Jones Industrial Average on the day of the flash crash indicate negative returns 
of -0.64% for the base sample. The negative return continues on the next day. Most of 
the stocks on the base sample have negative abnormal returns for the window period of 
[0, +1]. The cumulative abnormal return for the window period [0, +1] is -1.47% and is 
statistically significant. The results for matched samples does not provide any 
significant results.  
 
Table 6 provides us the abnormal returns for Dow Jones Industrial Average including 
VIX. The results on the day of the flash crash indicate negative returns of -0.58% for the 
base sample. The negative return continues on the next day and is also statistically 
significant. Most of the stocks on the base sample have negative abnormal returns for 
the window period of [0, +1]. The cumulative abnormal return for the window period 
[0, +1] is -1.32% and is statistically significant. The results for matched samples does 
not provide any significant results.  
 
The results gives us a strong indication of the negative impact of flash crash on the 
market structure. The negative impact is only seen in the base sample where trades were 
executed and then subsequently cancelled. The inclusion of the volatility index ‘VIX’ 
does not provide any substantial difference from the original results. Lee, Cheng and 
Koh (2011) had suggested in their paper that they were not very convinced with the 
cancellation of trades as it was an unfair to some market participants. The findings of 
the non-negative effect seen in the matched sample during the period of flash crash 
would support their understanding in respect to cancellation of trades to a certain extent.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
 
This thesis concentrates on the role of flash crash and its negative impact it brought 
about on May 06,2010 in the US markets. The influence of the crash is compared over a 
given time frame thus focusing not only on the event date but also before and after the 
crash. Distinction has been made between trades that got executed and were later 
cancelled by Nasdaq or NYSE Arca and those that were not cancelled.  
 
The findings do suggest that share holders wealth did deteriorate after the flash crash. 
Negative returns were found on the day of the flash crash and in some case even two 
days after the crash. The distinction between trades of those that were executed and 
cancelled and those that were not cancelled gives us an understanding of the impact it 
has on the returns between the two samples. The result suggest that the base sample 
stocks had consistently negative return on the day immediately after the crash and was 
responsible for eroding more of investors wealth as compared to those for the matched 
samples.The maximum impact was felt on Dow Jones Industrial Average with negative 
abnormal returns close to -0.83% for the day after the crash. The cumulative abnormal 
returns for all the four cases for the window period of [0,+1] is also negative for the 
base sample. It could also be seen from the results that the negative return is only 
persisten on the very next day or maximum on the day after it. This implies that the 
impact of the crash does not last for longer time span.  
 
The analysis done gives a clear indication that investors did incur losses on their 
investment and the whole scenairo could be attributed to being artifically created. This 
has raised various concerns regarding the ethical aspect of trading. Recent developments 
on manipulation has clearly suggested that a lot of regulations were compromised to 
benefit few selected people. Such practice should not be accepted and stringent 
measures should be taken to make sure events like this do not happen again. Focus 
should also be set on defining the regulations well so no loopholes can be used to 
manipulate the system. The regulators should ensure better framework for algorithm 
traders and should only allow strategies that would not create any kind of interference in 
the dynamics of trading. Similarly trading companies that take advantage of complex 
algorithms in their trading strategies should make sure they are done in compliance with 
the regulations set by the regulatory authority. Similary robust risk management system 
should be in place to ensure avoidance of undesirable incidences or errors. Trading 
systems and complex strategies should be well tested before engaging in any kind of 
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high volume trading. This could elminate the possibility of liquidity crisis that could 
arise due to trading errors. Circuit breakers should also be implemented to give 
investors a fair opportunity to reasscess the situation and avoid further movement of 
stocks due to panic. 
 
For further research it would be interesting to take into consideration the volumes and 
analyze the impact it could probably have on days after the flash crash. This would give 
a clear picture on the understanding of the negative sentiment and its persisance. 
Studying the effect of volumes could also help in understanding the issue of liquidity 
crisis and further measures could be taken to avoid such situations in the near future. 
Further extension of the research could be brought about by studing other international 
markets and analyzing how events like this in the US could affect markets of other 
countries especially those of emerging economies.  
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